Experts' agency problems: evidence from the prescription drug market in Japan
研究日本处方药市场中医生同时开药和卖药时，加价激励是否扭曲处方决策。实证发现加价影响处方选择，但医生对患者自付费用比自身利润更敏感。
This article examines the physician‐patient agency relationship in the context of the prescription drug market in Japan. In this market, physicians often both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket profits in so doing. A concern is that, due to the incentive created by the markup, physicians' prescription decisions may be distorted. Empirical results using anti‐hypertensive drugs suggest that physicians' prescription choices are influenced by the markup. However, physicians are also sensitive to the patient's out‐of‐pocket costs. Overall, although the markup affects prescription choices, physicians appear more responsive to the patient's out‐of‐pocket costs than their own profits from markup.