Naïve Herding in Rich-Information Settings
研究了在社会学习环境中，人们天真地认为每个人的行为只反映其私人信息，这种信念导致即使在理性人不会犯错的信息丰富环境中，天真者仍可能以正概率从众于错误行为，且因过度自信而受损。
In social-learning environments, we investigate implications of the assumption that people naïvely believe that each previous person's action reflects solely that person's private information. Naïve herders inadvertently over-weight early movers' private signals by neglecting that interim herders' actions also embed these signals. Such “social confirmation bias” leads them to herd with positive probability on incorrect actions even in extremely rich-information settings where rational players never do. Moreover, because they become fully confident even when wrong, naïve herders can be harmed, on average, by observing others.