Common Value Auctions with Insider Information
研究第一价格共同价值拍卖中，内幕信息知情者（内幕人）对竞拍行为和卖家收入的影响，发现经验丰富的竞拍者能克服赢家诅咒，内幕人利润更高且出价策略符合均衡理论。
Bidding is studied in first-price common value auctions where an insider is better informed than other bidders (outsiders) about the value of the item. With inexperienced bidders, having an insider does not materially reduce the severity of the winner's curse compared to auctions with a symmetric information structure (SIS). In contrast, super-experienced bidders, who have largely overcome the winner's curse, satisfy the comparative static predictions of equilibrium bidding theory: (i) average seller's revenue is larger with an insider than in SIS auctions, (ii) insiders make substantially greater profits, conditional on winning, than outsiders, and (iii) insiders increase their bids in response to more rivals. Further, changes in insiders' bids are consistent with directional learning theory (Selten and Buchta (1994)).