Does the Classic Microfinance Model Discourage Entrepreneurship Among the Poor? Experimental Evidence from India
通过印度田野实验，比较了要求立即还款的经典小额信贷合同与包含两个月宽限期的合同，发现宽限期增加了短期商业投资和长期利润，但也提高了违约率，表明早期还款要求抑制了流动性差的投资，限制了小额信贷对微型企业成长和减贫的潜力。
Do the repayment requirements of the classic microfinance contract inhibit investment in high-return but illiquid business opportunities among the poor? Using a field experiment, we compare the classic contract which requires that repayment begin immediately after loan disbursement to a contract that includes a two-month grace period. The provision of a grace period increased short-run business investment and long-run profits but also default rates. The results, thus, indicate that debt contracts that require early repayment discourage illiquid risky investment and thereby limit the potential impact of microfinance on microenterprise growth and household poverty.