Deposit insurance and risk taking
回顾存款保险理论，指出其假设在金融危机中不成立，导致政策失误；银行挤兑若与资产贬值相关，存款保险成本高昂甚至威胁主权偿付能力，需研究银行倒闭、存款保险、主权违约与货币贬值的关系。
We review the theory of deposit insurance, highlighting the underlying assumptions that were not satisfied during the recent financial crisis and that may have led to serious policy mistakes. In theoretical models, deposit insurance is mostly seen as an equilibrium selection device to avoid panic-based runs. In such a context, it is not drawn on and is thus costless and fully credible. However, if bank runs are linked to a fall in asset values, providing deposit insurance can be very costly and, as the case of Ireland has shown, can even threaten sovereign solvency. This perspective indicates a need for new research on the relation between bank failures, deposit insurance schemes, sovereign default, and currency depreciation, and for reforms of deposit insurance schemes. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.