Why a Decision Maker May Prefer a Seemingly Unfair Gamble
论证了风险厌恶的经理人若偏好正偏态分布，可能接受看似不公平的高风险项目，且所需最低回报更低，解释了为何他们愿意投资创新项目。
It is generally believed that risk-averse managers will not accept unfair gambles and therefore may not have the incentive to invest in high-risk projects, products or technology. This paper argues that this is not necessarily so. Rational, risk-averse managers with sufficient preference for positive skewness may undertake projects with payoff distributions that are unfair gambles. Furthermore, the minimum required payoff is shown to be less for managers with preference for positive skewness than otherwise. Thus, a risk-averse manager with preference for positive skewness may accept potentially innovative high-risk projects that are rejected by those without such preference.