CAN REGIONALIZATION OF LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES INCREASE A REGION'S WEALTH?*
研究了在集聚和拥堵外部性下，区域公共当局的服务策略如何影响企业选址，并比较了无当局、地方当局和区域当局三种情形下的经济效率与福利分布。
ABSTRACT. In the presence of agglomeration and congestion externalities the sequence of location choices made by firms results in an inefficient distribution of economic activity, since individual firms do not bear the congestion costs they impose on other firms. In this paper, we model the interaction of public authority service strategies and firm location choices. We show that a self‐interested regional authority can effect a welfare‐improving distribution of economic activity when compared with an economy without an authority or an economy with local authorities. However, we also show that the conditions under which the authority would induce a welfare enhancing distribution depends on the authority's strategic posture, as well as the nature and size of public subsidies for the authority. The conditions necessary for a regional authority to choose an efficiency enhancing strategy may be difficult to achieve.