"Mix and Match": Product Compatibility without Network Externalities
研究消费者可自行组装系统时，两家一体化企业先决定组件兼容性再竞争价格的两阶段博弈。对称完美纳什均衡显示完全兼容，虽提高价格但增加系统种类，部分消费者受益、部分受损；若标准化无成本，兼容提升社会剩余但可能降低消费者剩余。
In industries where consumers can assemble their own systems, firms must decide whether to make their components compatible with those of their rivals. We examine a two-stage game in which two fully integratedfirms make their compatibility decisions before competing in prices. The symmetric perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is shown to involve full compatibility. Although compatibility leads to higher prices than incompatibility, it also increases the variety of systems available so that some consumers are better off with compatibility, while others are hurt. If standardization is costless, compatibility increases social surplus, but may decrease consumer surplus.