Contested Tender Offers: An Estimate of the Hazard Function
估计了成为非善意收购要约目标公司的风险函数，发现初始溢价无解释力，而拍卖启动和机构持股比例显著增加风险，目标公司的法律和财务重组则有效降低风险。
In this article we estimate the hazard function (takeover probabilities) for firms that are targets in unsolicited tender offers. The data support a Weibull–gamma specification and imply a hazard rate that increases sharply in the initial period following the bid announcement, after which it declines steadily. In explaining the hazard, we find that the initial bid premium has no explanatory power, but the onset of an auction and the proportion of institutional ownership in the target firm significantly enhance the hazard. Legal and financial restructuring actions by target management are effective in reducing the hazard, thereby prolonging the contest.