Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
构建了一个包含截止日期、策略性延迟和不完美控制的讨价还价模型，解释了为何谈判常以空谈和拒绝开始，而协议往往在截止日期前达成。
Anecdotal and experimental evidence suggests that bargaining sessions subject to deadlines often begin with cheap talk and rejected proposals. Agreements, if they are reached at all, tend to be concluded near the deadline. We attempt to capture and explain these phenomena in a strategic bargaining model that incorporates a bargaining deadline, the possibility of strategic delay, and a lack of perfect player control over the timing of offers. Imperfect player control is generated by an exogenous uniformly-distributed random delay in offer transmission. Our model has a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, unique at almost all nodes, in which players adopt strategic delay early in the game, make and reject offers later on, and reach agreements late in the game if at all. In equilibrium players miss the deadline with positive probability. The expected division of the surplus is unique and close to an even split.