Takeover Contests, Toeholds and Deterrence
研究两个潜在买家（一个有持股、一个无持股）在收购竞争中的行为，发现持股者更激进，导致无持股者被威慑，除非其估值很高，否则不愿参与，从而造成效率损失。
Abstract We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares. The non‐toeholder anticipates this extra‐aggressiveness of the toeholder. Thus, he is deterred from participating unless he has a high valuation for the target company. This leads to large inefficiency losses. For many configurations, expected target returns are first increasing then decreasing in the size of the toehold.