Limited-Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects
研究一个风险中性经理在有限责任保护下管理多个项目的委托代理模型，发现激励问题是范围经济的一个自然来源，因为合并项目能放松有限责任约束，但也可能导致经理工作过载和努力过度。
I examine a principal-agent model with multiple projects where a risk-neutral manager is protected by limited liability. The analysis has several interesting implications: (i) incentive problems are shown to be a natural source of economies of scope, as combining multiple projects under the management of a single manager relaxes the limited-liability constraint; (ii) as a result, managers may be overloaded with work and exert inefficiently high effort; and (iii) the analysis has implications for the optimal allocation of projects to different managers. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.