Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts
研究企业和工人在工资与质量两个维度上的无限期讨价还价，工人有私人信息，企业通过提供合同菜单在第一期实现分离均衡，验证了多维讨价还价中的科斯猜想。
We investigate an infinite horizon bargaining problem in which a firm and a worker bargain over two dimensions, quality and wage. The worker has private information about his type. Only the uninformed firm makes an offer and it can offer a menu of quality-wage contracts instead of single one. We show that for all discount factors, the unique sequential equilibrium outcome is separating without delay; the firm separates the types of worker with a menu of contracts in the first period. Our result shows that in multi-dimensional bargaining, the "Coase Conjecture" holds in the sense that the game ends in the first period. But it fails in the sense that the uninformed party can preserve the entire bargaining power.