Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Municipalities
研究了美国城市两种政府形式（议会经理制与市长议会制）对公共支出的影响，理论预测市长议会制下支出更低，并通过横截面和面板数据分析验证了这一预测。
There are two main forms of government in U.S. cities: council-manager and mayor-council. This paper develops a theory of fiscal policy determination under these two forms. The theory predicts that expected public spending will be lower under mayor-council, but that either form of government could be favored by a majority of citizens. The latter prediction means that the theory is consistent with the co-existence of both government forms. Support for the former prediction is found in both a cross-sectional analysis and a panel analysis of changes in government form.