Capacity Investment, Preemption and Commitment in an Infinite Horizon Model
在无限期界双寡头模型中分析产能的承诺价值，比较反馈纳什均衡与预承诺均衡下的投资激励，发现反馈均衡中企业有先占投资动机，稳态产能水平更高。
The commitment value of capacity is analyzed in an infinite horizon duopoly model. The paper focuses on the role of alternative behavioral assumptions about the ability of firms to commit to investment paths. Each firm's investment strategy in a feedback Nash equilibrium is shown to be a decreasing function of its rival's current capacity. This creates an incentive for a firm to expand its capacity to preempt subsequent rival investment. In a precommitment equilibrium there are no incentives to invest preemptively. As a consequence, steady state capacity levels are greater in a feedback Nash equilibrium than in a precommitment equilibrium. Copyright 1987 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.