Entry-Deterrence in Stackelberg Perfect Equilibria
研究双寡头市场中，在位企业如何通过更广泛的预先承诺（如产能和库存）来威慑潜在进入者，并分析了存在固定成本时的完美均衡。
This paper examines entry deterrence in a duopoly where the postentry game is Stackelberg. It is argued that, in reality, firms can use a broader range of precommitments than is allowed for in the literature. This paper permits such precommitments and analyzes the perfect equilibria. It also allows for the fact that there may be fixed costs associated not only with entry, but with beginning production. Several interesting possibilities are explained, including the existence of excess capacity and the holding of inventories even in the absence of any uncertainty. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.