Perfect equilibrium and intergenerational conflict in a model of cooperative enterprise growth
用重叠世代模型研究合作企业的雇佣和投资决策，分析老员工与年轻员工因内部融资投资产生的利益冲突，以及不同决策权分配和多数投票规则对企业增长率的影响。
This paper employs an overlapping-generations model to examine the hiring and investment decisions of a cooperative enterprise whose members do not possess full ownership rights to capital. The need to internally finance investment generates a conflict of interest between junior and senior workers; the latter will be reluctant to forego salaries to self-finance investment if the returns are not fully realized before retirement. The resolution of this conflict determines the rate of growth of the firm. Solutions are first presented for two extreme scenarios: complete decision-making power to the old and complete decision-making power to the young. These solutions are then compared with the results of a majority-voting rule.