LOCATION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES WITH SPILLOVER EFFECTS: VARIABLE LOCATION AND PARAMETRIC SCALE*
研究两个相邻地方政府在考虑土地市场和溢出效应时如何选择公共设施位置，发现多数情况下一个城市会搭便车，且非合作均衡通常不是社会最优。
ABSTRACT This paper studies the location of public facilities of two neighboring local governments which consider not only the influence of the land market but also the spillover effects that each jurisdiction may have on the other. We obtain the following results: (1) in most cases, one of the cities behaves as an isolated city in choosing the facility location while the other enjoys the spillover effect as a free rider; (2) we also find that the equilibrium location in the two noncooperative city case is not socially optimal except for a special case.