Rent Sharing in an Equilibrium Model of Matching and Turnover
构建了一个可计算一般均衡模型，将工人和企业的异质性导致的薄市场与租金纳入分析，预测均衡工资随企业多样性、技能稀缺性和搜索成本变化，并应用于超级明星市场、体育工会谈判、行业工资差异及薪酬与利润关系。
This article characterizes labor markets in which the heterogeneity of workers and firms results in thin markets and rents. Neoclassical marginal analysis and matching are blended into a computable general equilibrium model of trade in efficiency units of labor. Although workers' bargaining problems are interrelated, a simple wage contract generates wage flexibility and efficient matching in the model's equilibrium. Equilibrium wages are predicted to vary with the diversity of firms, the scarcity of skills, and the costliness of search. The model is applied to superstar markets, union bargaining in sports, interindustry wage differentials, and the relationship between pay and profit. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.