Independence Threats, Litigation Risk, and the Auditor's Decision Process*
通过实验追踪48名审计经理的信息收集与评估过程，发现高独立性威胁（怕丢客户）使审计师更倾向出具无保留意见，而高诉讼风险则相反，且信息评估在其中起完全中介作用。
Abstract This study examines the effect of independence threats and litigation risk on auditors' evaluation of information and subsequent reporting choices. Using a Web‐based experiment, I tracked auditors' information gathering and evaluation leading to a going‐concern reporting decision. Specifically, 48 audit managers assessed client survival likelihood, gathered additional information, and suggested audit report choices. I found that auditors facing high independence threats (fear of losing the client) evaluated information as more indicative of a surviving client and were more likely to suggest an unmodified audit report, consistent with client preferences. In contrast, auditors facing high litigation risk evaluated information as more indicative of a failing client and were more likely to suggest a modified audit report. In addition, the association between risk and report choice was fully mediated by final information evaluation. This suggests that it is unlikely that different reporting choices resulted from a conscious choice bias, but rather that motivated reasoning during evidence evaluation plays a key role in the effect of risk in auditor decision making.