Debt, Performance-Based Incentives, and Firm Performance
发现，在业绩差的企业中提高薪酬与绩效的敏感度能改善风险调整后的绩效，但对高绩效企业影响不大；企业会在债务风险高时选择更高的敏感度。
We identify conditions of prior performance and pay-performance sensitivity under which an increase in incentives is associated with improved performance. We find that increasing sensitivity increases risk-adjusted performance in firms with poor prior performance, but has little impact on high-performance firms. We also observe that firms choose higher pay-performance sensitivity when the probability of wealth transfers to bondholders is high(e.g., in low-growth, high-debt firms). Pay-performance sensitivity to stock prices is important. If carefully implemented under the appropriate conditions, it can provide effective incentives for improving firm performance.