Labour Income Uncertainty, Taxation and Public Good Provision
在道德风险框架下研究收入不确定性时的最优非线性所得税、商品税和公共品供给，发现统一商品税和萨缪尔森规则在类似条件下仍可取，但可通过补贴特定商品和过度供给公共品来激励努力，并给出了最优边际所得税率的规则和数值模拟。
This article examines optimal nonlinear income taxation, commodity taxation and public good provision under income uncertainty in a moral hazard framework. Uniform commodity taxation and the Samuelson rule for public good provision are desirable under similar conditions as in the conventional tax model. Deviations from these rules is warranted if one can encourage effort by subsidising certain goods and overproviding public goods. We also determine a rule for the optimal marginal income tax rate and provide some numerical simulations. Conditions for the validity of the solution procedure used in this class of models, the first-order approach, are also explored. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007.