Payment schemes in infinite-horizon experimental games
研究了无限期界博弈实验中三种支付方案（累积支付、仅最后一期支付、随机一期支付）对参与者偏好的理论影响，并通过无限重复囚徒困境实验验证了理论预测。
Abstract We consider payment schemes in experiments that model infinite-horizon games by using random termination. We compare paying subjects cumulatively for all periods of the game; with paying subjects for the last period only; with paying for one of the periods, chosen randomly. Theoretically, assuming expected utility maximization and risk neutrality, both the cumulative and the last period payment schemes induce preferences that are equivalent to maximizing the discounted sum of utilities. The last period payment is also robust under different attitudes toward risk. In comparison, paying subjects for one of the periods chosen randomly creates a present-period bias. We further provide experimental evidence from infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games that supports the above theoretical predictions.