Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy
研究一个结合并推广了Williamson、Calvo-Wellisz和Keren-Levhari模型的层级模型，其中管理者和工人的努力水平、工资、控制幅度和层级数都是内生的，发现最优层级中工资和努力随层级下降而递减，且层级扩张时工资分布更偏斜。
This paper studies incentives and loss of control in a hierarchy model which combines and generalizes the models of Williamson, Calvo-Wellisz and Keren-Levhari. In our model of the hierarchy, the levels of effort from managers and workers, the wage scales, the span of control and, in particular, the total number of tiers are all endogenous. Using optimal control techniques, we show that in the optimal hierarchy the wage scales and effort levels decrease as one moves down the hierarchy. As the hierarchy expands with no technological progress, workers exert less effort and are paid less, top managers work harder and are paid more and the wage distribution becomes increasingly skewed.