Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice?
研究下游企业横向合并如何影响上游生产商的产能选择，发现产能成本低时合并会促使上游增加产能，成本高时则减少产能，这一非单调关系源于敲竹杠效应和议价侵蚀效应的相互竞争。
In this article, the effect of downstream horizontal mergers on the upstream producer's capacity choice was studied. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find a nonmonotonic relationship: horizontal mergers induce a higher upstream capacity if the cost of capacity is low, and a lower upstream capacity if this cost is high. This result is explained by decomposing the total effect into two competing effects: a change in holdup and a change in bargaining erosion.