Two-sided uncertainty in the monopoly agenda setter model
扩展了Romer-Rosenthal代议制民主模型，引入信号环境：代表知道现状但不知选民偏好，选民知道偏好但不知现状。研究发现，相比现状已知情形，代表的提案有向下偏差，而提案被接受的概率有向上偏差。
We extend the Romer-Rosenthal model of representative democracy to a signaling environment, in which (i) only the representatives knows the ‘status quo’ outcome resulting if her take-it-or-leave-it policy proposal is rejected by the voters, while (ii) only the voters know their true preferences over policies. A separating sequential equilibrium is shown to exist, and to uniquely satisfy a common equilibrium refinement. Furthermore, this equilibrium has the property that, relative to the environment where the status quo is known to the voter, there is a downward bias in the setter's proposal, and an associated upward bias in the probability of the proposal's acceptance by the voter.