Structural Estimation of Rank‐Order Tournament Games with Private Information
构建并求解了一个私有信息下的排序锦标赛博弈模型，利用家禽公司的合同结算数据估计对称纳什均衡的结构参数，并模拟锦标赛特征变化对养殖户和整合商福利的影响。
In this article we propose and solve a game‐theoretic model of a rank‐order tournament with private information. Using the contract settlement data from a poultry company, we estimate a fully structural model of a symmetric Nash equilibrium of this game. We show that growers' equilibrium effort depends on four factors: the spread in piece rates between the performance brackets, the number of players in each tournament, the number of performance brackets used, and the density of growers' private shocks. We use estimates to simulate how changes in the tournament characteristics affecting equilibrium effort impact the growers' and the integrator's welfare.