Targeted Agricultural Export Subsidies and Social Welfare
证明，利用不同市场的超额需求弹性差异，小规模定向出口补贴可以提高补贴国的社会福利，并以世界小麦市场为例验证了理论结论。
Global export subsidies are known to be welfare reducing. This paper demonstrates that a small targeted subsidy can increase the welfare of the subsidizing country by exploiting differences in excess demand elasticities. Targeted export subsidies can also increase the subsidizing country's welfare by exploiting transportation cost differences, excess supply elasticities of competitors, or excess demand elasticities of markets supplied by competitors when markets are shared. An empirical model of the world wheat market illustrates the theoretical conclusions. An optimal targeted subsidy scheme causes a small increase in U.S. welfare but with major disruptions in world trade flows.