On the Efficiency of the Market for Corporate Control
从微观经济学角度分析公司控制权市场中的交易，指出市场导向观点忽视的低效率问题，并论证许多所谓的效率提升在理论上并不成立，最后讨论对欧洲并购政策的启示。
A dominant strand of the present financial literature on takeovers views the purchase of a company as a simple exchange on a market that creates mutual gains from voluntary trade. The present paper questions this thesis on theoretical grounds by analyzing the interactions on this "market" from a microeconomic perspective. It points out inefficiencies that have been neglected by the proponents of the market-oriented approach and argues that many of the alleged efficiency gains are theoretically not conclusive. The conclusions of the analysis are shown to be consistent with the findings of the empirical literature and their relevance for European merger policy is discussed. Copyright 1990 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG