Exploiting Naïvete about Self-Control in the Credit Market
研究了当借款人偏好即时满足时，竞争性信贷市场中的合同选择、贷款偿还行为和福利，发现非老练借款人会过度借贷并支付高额罚金，导致福利损失，而限制延迟还款的高额罚金可提高福利。
We analyze contract choices, loan-repayment behavior, and welfare in a model of a competitive credit market when borrowers have a taste for immediate gratification. Consistent with many credit cards and subprime mortgages, for most types of nonsophisticated borrowers the baseline repayment terms are cheap, but they are also inefficiently front loaded and delays require paying large penalties. Although credit is for future consumption, nonsophisticated consumers overborrow, pay the penalties, and back load repayment, suffering large welfare losses. Prohibiting large penalties for deferring small amounts of repayment—akin to recent regulations in the US credit-card and mortgage markets—can raise welfare.