A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Electoral Competition
构建模型分析媒体如何影响投票行为和政党政策，发现媒体双头垄断比垄断更有利于选民福利，但联合所有权下的媒体多样性可能更高。
We characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies. Political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news. When there are two media outlets, each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views. Voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly. Two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones, but voter welfare is not always higher. © 2008 The Review of Economic Studies Limited.