The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After
运用委托代理方法分析监管者与被监管企业之间的契约关系，综述了不对称信息下最优契约设计、线性契约菜单、定价与成本补偿分离、激励契约拍卖、有限承诺动态契约及层级监管等核心成果，并讨论了实证含义与未来研究方向。
The new economics of regulation is an application of the principal-agent methodology to the contractual relationship between regulators and regulated firms. After a critique of the traditional paradigms of regulation from the point of view of information economics a canonical model of regulation under asymmetric information is developed. A survey of the main results obtained in the new economics of regulation is then provided, in particular concerning the implementation of optimal contracts by a menu of linear contracts, the dichotomy between pricing and cost reimbursement rules, the auctioning of incentive contracts, the dynamics of contracting under limited commitment, and the hierarchical problems in regulation. Empirical implications are then discussed and avenues of further research are described in the conclusion.