Multiperiod Wage Contracts and Productivity Profiles
当债权人拒绝将人力资本作为抵押品时，企业可通过提供长期工资合同来为工人提供金融中介。最优合同包含即期通用技能部分和基于工人特定技能在竞争对手处预期时间平均值的部分，该理论还解释了行业间工资路径差异和统计歧视。
When creditors do not honor human capital as collateral, firms can mediate financially by offering workers long-term wage contracts. The optimal contract specifies a wage consisting of a spot general skill component plus a component equal to the expected time-averaged value of the worker's specific skills with a competitor. Variations in the smoothed specific component are due only to changes in expectation about the likelihood of quitting a competing firm. The theory also explains interindustry disparities in wage paths and statistical discrimination by firms. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.