Transfer Program Complexity and the Take-Up of Social Benefits
研究了社会项目中复杂性作为筛选过程的副产品，如何导致不完全领取，并分析了最优项目设计中的复杂性、领取率与分类错误之间的权衡。
We model complexity in social programs as a by-product of the screening process. While a more rigorous screening process may improve targeting efficiency, the associated complexity is costly to applicants and induces incomplete take-up. We integrate the study of take-up with the study of rejection (Type I) and award (Type II) errors, and characterize optimal programs when policy makers choose screening intensity (and complexity), an eligibility rule, and a benefit level. Consistent with many real-world programs, optimal programs feature high complexity, incomplete take-up, classification errors of both Type I and II and, in some cases, “excessive” benefits.