The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance
构建了一个结合信号传递和自我选择机制的模型，利用1998年美国小企业金融调查数据，发现高质量创业者更可能提供抵押品并获得更低利率，为理解创业债务融资提供了新视角。
Abstract: Previous research has suggested collateral has the role of sorting entrepreneurs either by observed risk or by private information. In order to test these roles, this paper develops a model which incorporates a signalling process (sorting by observed risk) into the design of an incentive‐compatible menu of loan contracts which works as a self‐selection mechanism (sorting by private information). It then tests this Sorting by Signalling and Self‐Selection Model, using the 1998 US Survey of Small Business Finances. It reports for the first time that: high type entrepreneurs are more likely to pledge collateral and pay a lower interest rate; and entrepreneurs who transfer good signals enjoy better contracts than those transferring bad signals. These findings suggest that the Sorting by Signalling and Self‐Selection Model sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt finance than either the sorting‐by‐observed‐risk or the sorting‐by‐private information paradigms on their own.