Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence
基于不平等厌恶理论解释团队中的同伴压力，通过两期模型和实验发现，当贡献透明时，代理人会提高初期努力并根据中期信息调整后期努力，从而减少搭便车、提高效率。
We provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as though they were purely selfish. However, when contributions are made transparent at an interim stage, agents exert higher efforts in the first period and adjust their efforts according to the interim information in the second period. This form of peer pressure reduces free riding, and thus more efficient outcomes are attained. The results are confirmed in a real effort experiment. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago.