TROPICAL DEFORESTATION AND FOREST MANAGEMENT UNDER THE SYSTEM OF CONCESSION LOGGING: A DECISION‐THEORETIC ANALYSIS*
研究了特许采伐中因追求短期利润而非长期可持续产量导致的森林砍伐问题，通过序贯决策模型分析采伐者是否遵守合同条款，并探讨部分检查政策对遏制违规行为的有效性。
ABSTRACT. Deforestation caused by concession logging is often the result of harvest decisions which focus on short‐run profits rather than on long‐run sustainable harvest yields. A sequential‐decision model of this type of behavior is here developed which focuses on a logger's annual decisions of whether or not to remain in compliance with the terms of a concession contract. The contract stipulates harvesting procedures for a sustained forest yield, and noncompliance is taken to result in deforestation. An optimal decision policy for the concession logger is characterized in terms of optimal‐stopping theory, and is employed to construct payoff incentives which encourage compliance. In particular, a forest management problem is formulated which focuses on the effectiveness of partial inspection policies in deterring noncompliant behavior. General necessary and sufficient conditions for the effectiveness of such policies are established, and are given a more operational form for the Markov case. A numerical example based on actual concession‐contract data is also developed which suggests certain policy implications.