A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries
提出城市擅自占地的新理论，认为擅自占地者与正规居民竞争土地，推高正规市场价格，但组织者会控制挤压程度以避免被驱逐，并分析了正规化政策的一般均衡效应。
This paper offers a new theoretical approach to urban squatting, reflecting the view that squatters and formal residents compete for land within a city. The key implication is that squatters “squeeze” the formal market, raising the price paid by formal residents. The squatter organizer ensures that squeezing is not too severe, since otherwise, the formal price will rise to a level that invites eviction by landowners. Because eviction is absent in equilibrium, the model differs from previous analytical frameworks, where eviction occurs with some probability. It also facilitates a general equilibrium analysis of squatter formalization policies.