A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games
证明了一个异步重复博弈的民间定理：在有限不活动期条件下，每个可行且严格个人理性的收益向量都能作为子博弈完美均衡结果实现。
We prove a Folk Theorem for asynchronously repeated games in which the set of players who can move in period t, denoted by It, is a random variable whose distribution is a function of the past action choices of the players and the past realizations of Iτ's, τ=1, 2,…,t−1. We impose a condition, the finite periods of inaction (FPI) condition, which requires that the number of periods in which every player has at least one opportunity to move is bounded. Given the FPI condition together with the standard nonequivalent utilities (NEU) condition, we show that every feasible and strictly individually rational payoff vector can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of an asynchronously repeated game.