Labor-Market Integration, Investment in Risky Human Capital, and Fiscal Competition
构建一般均衡模型，分析劳动力市场一体化如何通过技能工人跨区迁移降低风险并提升效率，但若人力资本投资依赖地方税收，则会引发财政竞争，加剧低技能工人税负和收入不平等。
This paper presents a general-equilibrium model where human capital investment increases specialization and exposes skilled workers to region-specific earnings risk. Interjurisdictional mobility of skilled labor mitigates these risks; state-contingent migration of skilled labor also improves efficiency. With perfect capital markets, labor-market integration raises welfare and reduces ex post earnings inequality. If instead human capital investment can only be financed through local taxes, labor-market integration leads to interjurisdictional fiscal competition, shifting the burden of taxation to low-skilled immobile workers. Decentralized public provision of human capital investment creates earnings inequalities and is inefficient.