利用漏洞揭示监管的边际成本:以燃油经济性标准为例

Using Loopholes to Reveal the Marginal Cost of Regulation: The Case of Fuel-Economy Standards

American Economic Review · 2011
被引 154
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究发现,汽车制造商通过利用燃油经济性标准中的漏洞(如灵活燃料车辆补贴)来规避监管,从而间接揭示了合规的真实边际成本。据估算,近年来每加仑英里数标准每收紧一单位,每辆车成本仅增加9至27美元。

Abstract

Estimating the cost of regulation is difficult. Firms sometimes reveal costs indirectly, however, when they exploit loopholes to avoid regulation. We apply this insight to fuel economy standards for automobiles. These standards feature a loophole that gives automakers a bonus when they equip a vehicle with flexible-fuel capacity. Profit-maximizing automakers will equate the marginal cost of compliance using the loophole, which is observable, with the unobservable costs of strategies that genuinely improve fuel economy. Based on this insight, we estimate that tightening standards by one mile per gallon would have cost automakers just $9–$27 per vehicle in recent years.

利用漏洞监管边际成本燃油经济性标准汽车制造商