Vertical Foreclosure and International Trade Policy
研究当国内企业依赖国外垂直一体化企业供应关键中间产品时，外国企业和国家在古诺或伯特兰竞争下的供应决策，以及出口国的最优政策。
International differences in the cost of production of a key intermediate product can mean that a domestic firm is dependent on supplies from a foreign vertically integrated firm. This paper considers the incentives for the foreign firm and foreign country to supply the domestic firm when the firms compete in a Cournot or Bertrand market for the final product. The vertical supply decision is significantly affected by domestic supply conditions for the input and a domestic tariff on final product imports. Optimal policy by the exporting country may require a tax on both exports or a subsidy on both exports. Copyright 1991 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.