跨职能公开冲突及其通过商业战略的缓解

Overt Interfunctional Conflict (and Its Reduction Through Business Strategy)

RAND Journal of Economics · 1995
被引 59
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

研究生产和销售部门为何倾向于产生分歧,并分析这些分歧如何演变为公开冲突,以及企业如何从冲突中获益,同时指出冲突可能超过利润最大化水平,并探讨通过集中创新人才来减少冲突的方法。

Abstract

We study why production and sales departments tend to disagree, with the former wanting long production runs and the latter wanting a broad product line. We then analyze why these disagreements lead to overt conflict in which functional areas fight with each other by presenting arguments that damage each other's position. We show how the firm benefits from the information generated by this conflict. In spite of these benefits, the equilibrium conflict can exceed its profit-maximizing level. Finally, we show that concentrating innovative talent in only one department can help reduce interfunctional conflict.

部门间冲突生产-销售矛盾冲突信息价值创新人才集中