THE THEORY OF STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES IN MARKET ECONOMIES
探讨国有企业何时比私营企业更有效、不同建模方法、绩效表现及限制其负面影响的策略，指出意识形态和发展动机是国企起源的重要因素，但效率和创新考量下其规范性存在疑问。
Abstract. Four topics are covered: the circumstances under which state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) are more effective than private firms; the different approaches to modelling public and private firms; the performance of SOEs; and strategies including privatization to limit their more damaging effects. It is argued that ideological or development motives are important in their genesis, but that if efficiency and innovation are key considerations the normative case for their existence is more doubtful. Various types of SOE model are identified, deriving from the variety of circumstances in which they operate, and the theoretical perspective of the modeller. These include the property rights school, the public choice tradition, neoclassical, behavioural and budget maximizing approaches. All models assume the existence of monitoring problems, created by informational asymmetry. The consequences can include high non‐pecuniary benefits for managers, a concentration on monitored activities, and lower innovation levels and efficiency than private firms. Curiously this is not necessarily reflected in higher prices or costs. Possible remedial strategies include a change of ownership, a change of objectives, the introduction of incentive‐compatible payment schemes, improved performance indicators and privatization.