Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction
研究买方报价双向拍卖的贝叶斯博弈模型，证明当买卖双方人数不对称时，策略性虚报导致的效率损失随人数增加而收敛于零，并证明一般情形下均衡的存在性。
This paper concerns a Bayesian game model of the Buyer's Bid Double Auction, which is a procedure for organizing trade that selects a market-clearing price from a list of offers/bids. Strategic misrepresentation by traders may make the outcome of trade inefficient. Satterthwaite and Williams (1989) showed that misrepresentation and inefficiency quickly converge to zero as the number of traders on each side of the market increases. This is extended here to cases in which the number of buyers may differ from the number of sellers. The existence of equilibria in a generic instance of the model is also proven.