Technological Diffusion, Convergence, and Growth
构建了一个结合内生增长与新古典增长收敛性的模型，指出追随者因模仿成本低于创新而向领先者收敛，但模仿成本上升会降低其增长率，形成条件收敛，并讨论了知识产权对创新和模仿激励的影响。
We construct a model that combines elements of endogenous growth with the convergence implications of the neoclassical growth model. In the long run, the world growth rate is driven by discoveries in the technologically leading economies. Followers converge toward the leaders because copying is cheaper than innovation over some range. A tendency for copying costs to increase reduces followers' growth rate and thereby generates a pattern of conditional convergence. We discuss how countries are selected to be technological leaders, and we assess welfare implications. Poorly defined intellectual property rights imply that leaders have insufficient incentive to invent and followers have excessive incentive to copy.