The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents
研究民主制度下政治多数如何影响公司治理结构和劳动与资本回报，发现金融财富集中时，政治支持高劳动租金和银行或大投资者的强治理角色，与20世纪上半叶的“大逆转”现象一致。
In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the "great reversal" phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several financially developed countries a financially weakened middle class became concerned about labor income risk associated with free markets and supported a more corporatist financial system.