Free Cash Flow, Golden Parachutes, and the Discipline of Takeover Activity
发现，当自由现金流代理成本最严重时，公司会设立金色降落伞；被收购的目标公司在收购前过度投资，而收购方在收购后削减投资，表明接管活动起到了约束作用。
We conjecture that golden parachutes are initiated when the agency cost of free cash flow is most severe. We examine the relation between golden parachutes and investment levels in firms that have been successfully acquired. Our results support these three conclusions. First, target firms overinvest prior to an acquisition when golden parachutes are present. Second, the acquirers of targets with golden parachutes reduce investment subsequent to the takeover. Third, the reversal in capital investment by the combined firm is correlated with the magnitude of the target’s pre‐acquisition overinvestment. The latter findings indicate the takeover acts as a disciplining mechanism with the acquirer reversing the target overinvestment subsequent to the acquisition