Quality Distortion by a Discriminating Monopolist
挑战了垄断者质量歧视的标准模型，提出当消费者对质量的边际效用不随总效用递增时，垄断者可能提升而非降低低端产品质量以维持市场分割。
The standard model of monopolistic imperfect quality discrimination involving consumer self-selection has shown that no distortion occurs at the highest quality level, while all lower quality levels are degraded in order to maintain profitable market segmentation. This result flows from the assumption that consumers with a higher total utility of quality also have a higher marginal utility of quality. The paper develops a reasonable model in which the standard assumption is not satisfied, and this alternative model yields vastly different conclusions regarding the form of quality distortion. In particular, quality may be enhanced, not degraded, to maintain profitable market segmentation. Copyright 1989 by American Economic Association.