世纪之交煤矿业雇主垄断势力的检验

Testing for Employer Monopsony in Turn-of-the-Century Coal Mining

RAND Journal of Economics · 1995
被引 58
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

利用1897-1932年西弗吉尼亚州非工会煤矿的县级面板数据,估计逆劳动供给弹性,检验雇主垄断势力,发现煤矿主几乎未享有垄断权力。

Abstract

Isolated company towns are often cited as likely examples of labor monopsony. This article tests for monopsony power by estimating inverse labor supply elasticities using a county-level panel dataset on nonunion West Virginia coal mining from 1897 to 1932. The model specification incorporates dynamics in such a way that an estimate of the gap between marginal revenue product and the wage can easily be computed as a weighted average of short- and long-run inverse elasticities. Modest estimated short-run inverse elasticities and very small long-run inverse elasticities imply that coal operators enjoyed little, if any, monopsony power over their workers.

雇主垄断劳动力供给弹性煤矿业公司城镇